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There is increasing awareness that sexual violence is distinct from other aspects of civilian 
victimization in civil wars.  Few studies have examined the independent impact of such 
violence on responses to civil wars as compared to “traditional” forms of violence.  This 
paper explores whether reports of high levels of rape and sexual violence increase the 
probability of UN attention to conflicts and calls to action.  In so doing, we combine original 
data on UN Security Council resolutions with data on sexual violence in armed conflict and 
estimate the impact of sexual violence on UN attention to all civil wars from 1990-2009.  We 
show that the effects of sexual violence on the number and level of UNSC resolutions are 
shown to be significant even when controlling for other important determinants of UN action.  
These findings have important implications for understanding how the UN has expanded its 
view on protecting civilians.   
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Introduction 
  Attention to sexual violence has skyrocketed since the Bosnian and Rwandan civil 
wars in the 1990s.  Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the State Department 
all regularly report on systematic abuse and document specific, important episodes of sexual 
violence.1  Human Rights Watch (2005, 7) report an example from second Congolese civil 
war where 
…tens of thousands of women and girls were raped or otherwise subjected to 
sexual violence.  Victims whose cases Human Rights Watch documented were as 
young as three years old. In a number of cases men and boys were also raped or 
sexually assaulted. The World Health Organization investigated the incidence of 
rape … and concluded that some forty thousand persons had been raped. 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) responded to the conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by passing a dozen resolutions in the 2003-2004 
period.  However, based on most prior research on the determinants of UNSC action and 
resolutions, we would not have expected that the United Nations (UN) to be active towards 
this conflict, since neither battle deaths nor civilian casualties were particularly high during 
the 2003-2004 period reported (Fortna 2004, 2008, Beardsley and Schmidt 2012, Hultman 
2013, Hultman et al. 2013).   
                                                          
1
 We use the definition of sexual violence employed by the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset, 
focusing on the forms of violence that make up sexual violence rather than the targets of such violence, directly 
based on the International Criminal Court (ICC), Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 
(2000). Article 8 (2)(e): https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/724/27/PDF/N0072427.pdf?OpenElement, Accessed on 27-05-2018. In 
summary, sexual violence includes reports of rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and 
forced sterilization/abortion, mutilation and sexual torture. This definition of sexual violence does not exclude 
the existence of female perpetrators and male victims, both of which are observed in the data.  However, the 
SVAC definition does not include sexual harassment, humiliation or forced nudity (Cohen and Nordås 2013: 7) 
http://www.sexualviolencedata.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/SVAC-coding-manual-10-25-13.pdf, Accessed 
on 27-05-2018.  
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What then, explains the high number of UNSC resolutions on the DRC in addition to 
the traditional attributes held to predict to UN activity?  We suggest that a high prevalence of 
widespread sexual violence can explain UN attention to this and other civil conflicts.  Recent 
work suggests that sexual violence is a distinct type of violence against civilians and can 
occur at all stages of conflict (Nordås 2011; Cohen, Nordås, and Wood 2014).  Given 
prominence of sexual violence in many conflicts, we expect that reported sexual violence can 
have an independent effect on promoting UNSC resolutions.  
We recognize the deep-rooted structures that may engender sexual violence 
highlighted by feminist researchers (Enloe 2000; 2002; Meger 2016; Seifert 1994). Sexual 
violence often reflects deeper forms of hierarchical, violent social structures with 
implications beyond domestic and international security (MacKenzie 2010; Meger 2016).  
Our focus here is not to explain the origins of sexual violence but rather examine how the UN 
responds to the relative magnitude of reported sexual violence.  We posit that high prevalence 
of stated sexual violence has been an important predictor of UNSC resolutions in the post-
cold war period, even before the “formal recognition” in resolutions addressing the status of 
women and children with Resolution 1820.  It is vitally important to understand the 
determinants of these resolutions. 2   UNSC resolutions are precursors for most UN actions 
and the indicators of global attention and great power willingness to act in specific conflicts.  
The presence, number and intensity of UNSC resolutions thus indicate global interest in 
conflicts and the potential for action or intervention in civil wars.  
 
 
                                                          
2
 While the definition of sexual violence includes both male and female victims, in practice most victims of 
sexual violence are women and children. Thus, in practice resolutions such as 1820 highlight women and 
children as victims of sexual violence even though men are also victims of sexual violence in the same conflicts.   
4 
 
 We use an original data set on all UNSC resolutions from 1989 to 2014 to examine 
their relationship to the presence, count, and intensity of sexual violence in UCDP/PRIO 
conflicts.  We find a robust, significant relationship between reports of sexual violence in a 
conflict and the likelihood that the UNSC will address a civil conflict in a resolution as well 
as how often. We also find evidence that reports of systematic sexual violence go together 
with a higher intensity in UNSC response, measured by the type of action called for in 
resolutions in a conflict-year, as well as the number of resolutions calling for high levels of 
action (e.g., sanctions or the outside use of force).3   
Our analysis shows that the impact of sexual violence on resolutions is independent of 
prior UNSC resolutions and the presence of peacekeeping missions in a conflict as well as 
other well-established indicators of violence in civil wars.  In short, our results indicate that 
sexual violence is a separate conflict attribute driving the likelihood of UNSC resolutions.  
These findings have meaningful implications for understanding international conflict 
intervention and suggest that the norms and motivations of conflict management are perhaps 
not as limited as suggested in prior literature.  Our findings suggest that the likelihood of 
intervention, which presumes prior UNSC resolutions, is related to a widening understanding 
of and attention to specific types of violence against civilians and innocents.   
Challenging the norm of sexual violence in armed conflicts  
Sexual violence in armed conflict is not a new phenomenon, although awareness 
about it may be.  Enloe (2002) points out that the looting, pillage and rape nexus has been 
characteristic of violent conflict throughout the history of humankind.    Cases of rape by 
German or Russian forces during WWII or the “rape of Nanking” are by now well 
                                                          
3
 Many low-level resolutions are followed by high-level resolutions and almost all UNSC high-level resolutions 
are followed by actions.  There is usually a time gap between SC resolutions and the onset of the action called 
for by the UNSC. Thus, resolutions reflect attention and intent rather than direct action by the UNSC.    
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documented, but did not draw much international attention at the time.  The violent nine-
month Bangladesh War of Independence in 1971 was the first time that international attention 
started focusing on rape as a form of political and military strategy independent from other 
forms of atrocities (Brownmille 1975; Skjelsbaek 2010).  Sexual violence and rape were 
widespread in many of the armed conflicts in Latin American countries such as Guatemala in 
the 1970s, even though, there was significant variation in the spread of these phenomena 
(Wood 2006).  Yet, sexual violence remained both understudied and under-analyzed as it was 
not considered equivalent to other forms of violence such as killings and torture often 
observed in armed conflicts (Meger 2016; Skjelsbaek 2001). Early feminist research made 
the case that sexual violence was not an inevitable by-product of war, but a reflection of the 
unequal gender relationships and insecurity experienced by women in their daily lives both in 
war and peace (Kelly 2000).  
It was not until the 1990s when public attention shifted, and mass documentation of 
rape and sexual violence started with the cases of Bosnia and Rwanda.  The shocking reports 
galvanized public opinion to address sexual violence in wars and persecute the perpetrators 
(Skjelsbaek 2010).  After the international recognition of sexual violence in Bosnia, the 
international community was prepared to at least document cases of rape and sexual violence. 
By 1998-1999 when the war in Kosovo took place, sexual violence was part of the 
international agenda (Skjelsbaek 2010: 22).  
What drew attention to rape and sexual violence in the cases of Rwanda and Bosnia 
was a pattern of violence that became closely intertwined with genocide or ethnic cleansing.  
Sexual violence became an integral component of warfare where the goal was to destroy the 
enemy.  Researchers have particularly linked sexual violence to conflicts of identity where 
special cultural value is attached to the women of the enemy group and violence was gender 
specific with a cultural function to harm the collective identity of the group (Bos 2006; 
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Seifert 2016).  Sexual violence in conflicts such as Sierra Leone and the DRC in the 2000s 
led to the conceptualization of sexual violence as a strategic choice and a “weapon of war” 
(Cohen 2013; Wood 2006; 2009).   
Feminist scholars, have argued against simplistic definitions. They problematized the 
concepts of security and sexual violence as applied in most of the international security 
literature (Baaz and Stern 2008, 2010, 2013; Meger 2016).  Scholars like Skjelsbaek (2010) 
and Seifert (1994) argued that sexual violence has distinct characteristics from other types of 
violence observed in wars, because it reflects fundamental power dynamics rooted in social 
norms and institutions both in war and beyond war.  Earlier feminist literature conceptualized 
sexual violence as being embedded in the militarization of societies and gender unequal 
relationships (Enloe 2000; Seifert 1994).   
Recent research has focused on the causes of sexual violence in armed conflict within 
two lines of inquiry—either as an opportunistic by-product of war or as a strategic weapon of 
war (Meger 2016).  However, scholars including Eisenstein (2007), Mackenzie (2010), 
Meger (2016), and Whitworth (2004) have challenged this work for moving away from early 
feminist discourse by adopting narrow concepts of security and sexual violence. Adopting 
formulaic and narrow concepts, usually emphasizing rape, researchers sensationalize sexual 
violence.  The narrative of rape as a weapon of war creates hierarchies of crime severity 
leading to the securitization of sexual violence in research, advocacy, and policy. As a result, 
“gender” and sexual violence become hollow concepts depleted from their political 
dimension (Meger 2016: 150). The fetishization of sexual violence separates the act from its 
root causes in unequal gender relationships, while the securitization process frames sexual 
violence as an abnormal and existential threat to social norms and family life (Mackenzie 
2010: 217).  
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Mackenzie (2010) uses unstructured interviews and the court case archives by the 
Government of Sierra Leone and the UN against the major warring factions in the conflict of 
Sierra Leone and Charles Taylor to identify multiple forms of oppression and abuse. All these 
forms, from forced marriage and pregnancy to slavery and abduction, were interlinked with 
sexual violence and rape, and ultimately the structure of the family unit. As a result, the 
stigma, marginalization, and suffering of the victims and their families continued after the 
end of the conflict reproducing unequal and oppressive power dynamics outside the war time 
frame (Mackenzie 2010). 
The motivations of perpetrators who engage in sexual violence and the structures that 
enable them to engage in sexual violence do not alter the fact that sexual violence during 
armed conflict has an impact on security and peace empirically distinct from other forms of 
violence (Cohen 2013; Hoover Green 2011; Skjelsbaek 2001: 80; Wood 2009).  Thus, many 
actors in global politics, such as the UN and NGOs, categorize sexual violence as a matter of 
security and peace. As such it fully warrants attention and potentially a security response by 
the international community (Anderson 2010: 246-247).4  
UN Security Council and protection from sexual violence 
The complexity of sexual violence in armed conflict leads to questions regarding the 
specific responses of international organizations and the UN to often emotive reports of such 
basic human rights violations.  In other words, is sexual violence a “characteristic” of violent 
armed conflicts that influences the willingness of the UN Security Council to pay attention to 
conflicts involving sexual violence?   Prior research on the decision-making process of the 
                                                          
4
 It is important to note that Sexual violence does not always coincide with other forms of atrocities.  For 
example, in Sierra Leone, sexual violence comes before higher levels of civilian battle deaths while in the DRC 
after 1998, battle deaths seem to precede higher levels of sexual violence and reported rates of sexual violence 
are elevated even when civilian deaths and battle deaths are not.   In short, a majority of conflicts exhibit a 
pattern where sexual violence is relatively independent from other forms of violence in civil wars.   
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UN Security Council (SC) has primarily focused on narrowly defined security and strategic 
aims of the country members of the Security Council, especially the permanent five (P5) 
members. The common assumption is that the UNSC responds only to cases of economic and 
military strategic interest of the P5, ignoring conflicts and crises that do not fit these criteria, 
especially in mandating peacekeeping missions (Stojek and Tir 2015).  
Studies such as Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) showed that national interest is not the 
only one that determines whether the UN Security Council will sanction the involvement of 
UN in a crisis. Other researchers (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013) suggest that the 
Security Council responds to humanitarian crises and threats against civilians.  Meanwhile 
Benson and Kathman (2014), by examining UNSC resolutions, argue that the Security 
Council takes decisions for or against specific conflict actors based on aggregate Security 
Council member preferences. In other words, it is not just the country characteristics that 
motivate the SC to sanction a UN intervention, but also the conflict dynamics.  
In 2000, it became clear that the UN Security Council had come to accept that sexual 
violence is a specific form of violent behavior that threatens security and thus deserves 
attention independently from other forms of violence against civilians.  The formalization of 
this attitude began with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and was 
solidified by UNSCR 1820 (2008).  The attention on sexual violence preceded similar trends 
in protecting civilians from violence in intrastate conflicts galvanized with the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P) in 2005 (Bellamy 2009; Evans and Sahnoun 2002; Stahn 2007).   
The concurrence of several UNSC resolutions and R2P suggests a shift in 
international law to address crimes against humanity and mass atrocities. In all, the collected 
activism could generate a stronger sense of moral responsibility to protect women and girls 
from sexual violence, including changing the international legal landscape. The International 
Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia (ICTY 1993) and Rwanda (ICTR 1994) recognized sexual 
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violence in armed conflict as a war crime and a crime against humanity (Chun and Skjelsbæk 
2010).  It was UNSCR 1325 that formally demarcated sexual violence in conflict as a threat 
to peace and security.5  
The numerous follow-up resolutions to UNSCR 1325 in the UN’s Women Peace and 
Security Agenda have become increasingly detailed in their provisions. A large amount of 
Security Council statements exists where Secretary General reports on events and 
implementation policies have been formulated to translate the emerging norm on the role of 
gender in peace and security into action. Attention to these issues has also spread to decisions 
and policies in many regional organizations and states.  While some resolutions specifically 
refer to UNSCR 1325 (e.g., resolution 1565 addressing the DRC conflict in 2004), most 
resolutions on civil conflicts do not and many UNSC resolutions fail to address sexual 
violence when it is present (e.g., resolution 1555 addressing the DRC conflict in 2004). 
Indeed, it took eight years after the passage of UNSCR 1325 until Security Council resolution 
1820 (2008) became the first resolution to exclusively address sexual violence in armed 
conflict.  
A distribution of all the UNSC resolutions mentioning violence against women and 
children is presented in Appendix (see Figure A1).  As is illustrated, the UN did not begin to 
                                                          
5 The resolution was the result of a long political and historical process. It had its roots in the adoption of the UN 
Charter in 1945. From the “UN Decade for Women” (1975-85) women’s situation and gender equality became 
increasingly connected to questions of international peace and security.  The development was further enforced 
in the “Beijing Declaration and Plan of Action”, adopted in 1995 at the UN Decade for Women.  When UNSCR 
1325 was finally adopted in October 2000, it rested on a substantive policy development involving member 
states – such as Bangladesh, Namibia, Canada, and Jamaica – women’s civil society organizations from areas 
affected by armed conflict (for example, Guatemala and Somalia), and UN actors inside the UN system. The 
interchange between international organizations, member states, NGOs and civil society has remained a key 
component of the policy work on gender in relation to international peace and security; a work that has resulted 
in a number of follow-up resolutions: UNSCR 1820(2008), 1888(2009), 1889(2009), 1960(2010), 2106(2014) 
and 2122 (2014) (for an overview of this process, see, for example, Binder, Lukas, and Schweiger 2008; Carey 
2001; Cohn, Kinsella, and Gibbings 2004; Krause 2015;  Olsson 2000; Shepherd 2008; Tryggestad 2009). The 
ongoing developments related to the role of gender for peace and security also influenced the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, required to transform the normative developments into practical work (Olsson and 
Gizelis 2015).    
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formally address violence against women and children in its resolutions until the early 
2000’s.   Indeed, the UN has a history of under-reporting the nature and extent of atrocities 
within its resolutions and even refusing to explicitly name specific aggressors in conflicts 
(Benson and Kathman 2014).  Does this lack of specific mention of atrocities (i.e., sexual 
violence, genocide, civilian massacres) in a UNSC resolution mean that the UN is not aware 
of or paying attention to important conflict attributes within a civil war?   
We argue strongly that this is not the case.  While the UN does often not respond 
appropriately (or at all) to the majority of civil or international conflicts in resolutions 
(Benson and Satana 2008), it is generally accepted that when the UNSC does pass a 
resolution, it is based upon a documented disturbance to the security of populations, 
governments, or regions.  Indeed, much of the literature on UN actions or the use of force 
does not suggest an explicit link between UN actions and UN recognition of conflict 
attributes (e.g., Beardsley and Schmidt’s 2012 work on International Crises).  To obtain 
consensus between P5 members, UN resolutions are often purposely vague in assigning 
blame or in mentioning specific events.  The delayed and often limited mention of sexual 
violence or lack of referral to sexual violence resolutions by the Security Council does not 
mean that the UN is blind or indifferent to the phenomenon.  Just as every UNSC resolution 
does not mention all atrocities in conflicts, the same may be said for the crime of sexual 
violence in civil war (Johansson and Hultman n.d.).   
Given that the language of resolutions cannot be used to determine attention to 
specific atrocities, we must turn to the empirical association between the existence of UNSC 
resolutions on a specific conflict and the conflict’s attributes (as has been suggested by the 
above literature).  If, for example, there is a statistically significant relationship between 
civilian deaths, conflict intensity or sexual violence and the presence or intensity of UNSC 
resolutions, it suggests that the UN is focused on addressing such atrocities within the context 
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of civil wars.  Indeed, just such an approach has been employed by much of the quantitative 
literature on UN resolutions and UN peacekeeping, discussed immediately below.  In the 
Sierra Leone, reporting of high prevalence of sexual violence precedes the initiation of a UN 
mission within the country (Sierra Leone).  Similarly, in the case of DRC increasing levels of 
sexual violence are associated with resolutions mandating UN missions to protect vulnerable 
civilians from physical harm, such as  Resolutions 1291 (2000), 1565 (2004),  and  1856 
(2008) that expanded the mandate and the size of United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).  
A theoretical approach to factors influencing UN attention to civil wars 
What then, determines whether the UN passes resolutions on specific armed conflicts?  
Are the national interests of the P-5 in Security Council the deciding factor for UN action as 
often assumed (Anderson 2000; Carter 2007; Gibbs 1997; Stojek & Tir 2015)? The literature 
on UN interventions tries to provide answers to these questions by focusing on the 
characteristics of the conflict. Gilligan and Stedman (2003: 38) showed that conflict severity, 
measured in terms of causalities, as the key factor for intervention. Fortna and de Jonge 
Oudraat also suggest that UN tends to intervene in more severe conflicts (Fortna 2004; 2008; 
de Jonge Oudraat 1996). Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) show that although the national 
interests of the five permanent members of the Security Council influence and constrain the 
ability of the UN to act in international crises, the severity of conflicts is a more important 
predictor of UN intervention. Thus, the UN abides by the principle of the responsibility to 
protect civilians and intervenes mainly in so-called “hard cases” (see also Hultman 2013; 
Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2016).  Benson and 
Kathman (2014) also show that the UN Security Council’s decisions are driven not only by 
the intensity of the conflict, as well as the national interests of the Security Council members, 
but also by links to local actors and a vested interest in the conflict dynamics.  Their study 
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suggests that the Security Council members might take a more nuanced and intricate 
approach to the unfolding of conflicts that is often assumed. 
Within its institutional format, the UN has the agency to address specific issues of 
civilian concern and security through the organ of the Security Council.  Action within the 
UNSC is largely manifested through the passing of resolutions. UN Security Council 
Resolutions are legally binding documents that signal the resolve of the Council to pay 
attention on specific issues and eventually take action. Furthermore, UNSC resolutions 
require consensus to be legally binding. In practical terms, for a resolution to pass, it must 
obtain nine Security Council votes.  This means the resolution must be supported (or not 
actively opposed) by the Permanent Five members of the Security Council and have support 
from at least four (out of ten) non-permanent members.   
While the composition of the non-permanent members varies, there is evidence that 
financial aid by the US, Germany and the UN itself is correlated with the tenure of a non-
rotating member (Kuziemeke and Werker 2006). A possible policy implication of the 
correlation between aid and the tenure of non-permanent members is regardless of the 
composition of the Security Council there are enough incentives for non-permanent members 
to converge on specific policy agendas. This convergence of preferences is a possible 
explanation of why many resolutions successfully pass and very few fail (Kuziemeke and 
Werker 2006).   
Resolutions thus represent the cohesion of preferences in the UNSC among the key 
agenda setters and indicate a general agreement among the P5 to address a conflict or issues 
pertained to security within that conflict.  We expect that if sexual violence is perceived a 
threat to security and a political priority, then the UNSC should be equally motivated to pass 
a resolution in conflicts when there have been reports high levels of such abuses.  While not 
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all resolutions lead to action, the passage of any resolution is a clear indication that the UNSC 
has focused on a conflict.   
These resolutions do not need to name a specific factor (e.g. violence against 
civilians, high levels of battle deaths, etc.) to exert influence or reflect the political will of the 
UN Security Council.   Yet, we still expect that if the many conflict factors identified in the 
literature matter, then the UNSC could signal its willingness to address specific conflicts 
through the mechanism of passing resolutions.  Empirically, we posit that if sexual violence 
is viewed as a salient conflict factor by the UN, there should be a higher probability of a 
UNSC resolution on an armed conflict after reports of sexual violence independent from 
other factors that might characterize and draw attention to the conflict. In addition, a higher 
number of UNSC resolutions passed on a conflict suggests an even greater UNSC attention 
to, and focus on, an armed conflict. We summarize the theoretical discussion above in the 
following hypotheses: 
H1: Higher levels of sexual violence in an armed conflict are associated with a higher 
probability of a UNSC resolution (net of any other characteristics) in the conflict-year. 
H2: Higher levels of sexual violence in an armed conflict are associated with larger number 
of UNSC resolutions in a conflict-year. 
Finally, we posit that if the UNSC considers sexual violence to be an important conflict 
attribute, then we would expect a more robust response within the resolutions themselves.  As 
such, we suggest that a higher prevalence of sexual violence should lead to higher levels of 
suggested UN action within the resolutions (e.g., peacekeeping vs. diplomacy) and a higher 
frequency of high-level resolutions within a conflict-year. 
H3: Higher levels of sexual violence in a conflict are associated with a higher level of 
proscribed action in the UNSC resolutions in a conflict-year. 
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H4: Higher levels of sexual violence in a conflict are associated with a higher number of 
resolutions with a high level of recommended action in the UNSC resolutions in a conflict-
year. 
Research Design and Data 
In estimating the relationship between UNSC resolutions and reports on the 
prevalence of sexual violence, we examine all intrastate conflict-years included in the 
UCDP/PRIO dataset from 1990 until 2009. 
Dependent Variables  
We employ four dependent variables to test the four propositions.  These four UNSC 
resolution variables were coded as part of an original dataset on UN Security Council 
Resolutions that pairs UCPD/PRIO armed conflicts with their respective United National 
Security Council resolutions.6  Both the target and level of action for all resolutions on 
intrastate conflicts are coded for the post-cold war period.  Resolutions are coded to conflicts 
based on the specific mention of the conflict or conflict actors within a resolution.  When 
multiple conflicts are implicitly referred to in a UNSC resolution, the dataset codes the 
resolution as an “umbrella” resolution pertaining to multiple conflicts.  The bivariate and 
count variables used here include both the specific and umbrella UNSC resolutions. 
The distribution of resolutions across time in the 1990-2014 period has been relatively 
constant.  However, note that our empirical results are limited to the 1990-2009 period due to 
independent variable limitations.  During this period, there is no discernible pattern for the 
number of resolutions the UN passed on civil conflicts in a particular year as illustrated in 
                                                          
6
 UCDP uses a very specific definition of violent armed conflict that excludes forms of political violence, e.g. 
riots. Feminist research has challenged concepts used in mainstream security literature (Meintjes, Turshen, and 
Pillay  2001; Sjoberg 2013). Nevertheless, this paper primarily contributes to the empirical research on 
peacekeeping. Thus, we benchmark our analysis to the extant research using the same measurements and 
methods.  
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Appendix A2.  We also think it important to note that conflicts receiving high-levels of 
attention from the UN via UNSC resolutions varies substantially from year-to year. 
The first of our dependent variables is the presence of a UNSC resolution in a conflict 
year where 1= the presences of a UNSC resolution, 0 otherwise.  Our second dependent 
variable is the count of UNSC resolutions in a conflict/year (as exhibited in Figure 3).  This 
variable ranges from 0 resolutions per year (e.g., Mali, Senegal) to 14 resolutions per year 
(e.g., Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993).  As with the presence of UNSC resolutions, we expect 
that severe sexual violence should be associated with sustained UNSC attention to a conflict 
during the year.   
To code our third dependent variable, the level of action proposed in a UNSC 
resolution, we code the text of all resolutions relating to UCDP intra-state conflicts.  The 
level of action is coded on a six-point scale where: 
0 = no resolution 
1= resolution pertaining to conflict (no request, action by UN) 
2= demand towards the government, rebels or no target of demand 
3= diplomacy (establishment of mediation, good offices, or committee) 
4= sanction or siege 
5= approval or extension (time or troops) of the use of force by an outside actor (state 
or IGO) 
6 = formation or extension (time or troops) of a UN peacekeeping mission 
 
Finally, we examine the count of high-level actions within a conflict-year.  This 
variable best allows us to obtain best ascertain the level of high-intensity responses regarding 
civil conflicts.  This dependent variable is counts the number of resolutions that score a 4, 5, 
or 6 on the level of action scale above.  The variable ranges from 0 to 11 in the conflict-year 
(e.g., 10 for Angola in 1998, and 11 for Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993).   
Independent Variables 
Our primary independent variables measure the reported prevalence of sexual 
violence in UCDP conflicts (Cohen and Nordås 2014).  Cohen and Nordås’ data set includes 
variables on the prevalence of sexual violence in civil conflicts.  The data are based on the 
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three most common datasets in quantitative human rights literature: The US State Department 
annual reports; Human Right Watch reports; and Amnesty International annual and 
systematic reports (Cohen and Nordås 2013).7  The SVAC dataset measures the prevalence of 
sexual violence as an estimate of the reported magnitude of sexual violence by Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and the State Department.  The definitions in SVAC 
largely reflect the concepts and normative assumptions of international agencies of what 
constitutes “sexual violence”. Such concepts partly reflect the political nature of sexual 
violence and delineate who can be included as a victim of sexual violence and who is 
excluded (Zalewski et al 2018).  By adopting the SVAC definitions and data we can compare our 
key findings to other empirical studies on UN response to conflicts. 
 
These three variables are measured on an ordinal scale where  
0= no reported sexual violence 
1= some:  reports, isolated reports, or there continued to be reports of sexual violence 
2= Several/many:  widespread:  common, commonplace, extensive, frequent, often, 
persistent, recurring, a pattern, a common pattern, or a spree 
3= Massive: innumerable, or systematic 
 
Following Beardsley and Schmidt’s (2012) approach to crisis severity and duration in 
predicting UN resolutions and responses to international conflicts, we also employ predictor 
variables that are contemporaneous with our dependent variables.  Nevertheless, we have run 
a series of robustness checks with lagged variables (and different combinations of lagged 
variables) to ensure that our findings are robust to a variety of variable specifications.  
A distribution of the State Department reports of sexual violence over time illustrates 
that there have been consistent reports of all levels of sexual violence over the period of the 
study (see Appendix Figure A3).  Virtually identical distributions are found with the Amnesty 
                                                          
7
 Their codebook provides detailed information regarding the sources, coding rules, and data limitations. In 
general, the US State Department reports are the most comprehensive, followed by Amnesty International. 
Human Rights Watch has more gaps in annual reports than the other two datasets. For additional discussion of 
these variables and the definition of sexual violence, please see footnote 1. 
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International and Human Rights Watch variables over time.  While our dependent variable 
ranges from 1989 until 2014, the use of Sexual Violence variables limits the time period to 
the 1990-2009 period.  
Control Variables 
To account for additional humanitarian concerns and the UN’s responsibility to protect 
noncombatants, we control for the total number of civilian deaths in a conflict-year, (in 
10,000s) as coded by the UCDP GED Conflict Polygon Dataset (Croicu, and Sundberg 
2012).  The protection of civilians has become a core principal espoused by Secretaries 
General. Thus, one might expect rising civilian deaths to be associated with a greater 
likelihood of attention from the UNSC and an increased number of resolutions in a conflict-
year.  Importantly, civilian battle deaths are relatively independent from the Human Rights 
Watch, State Department, and Amnesty International measures of sexual violence 
(correlations are r=0.17, r=0.08, and r=0.11 respectively).  Thus, the presence of high levels 
of civilian casualties is not a strong determinant of the presence of sexual violence in civilian 
conflicts.  While one-sided violence against civilians is an important control variable in our 
analyses, it is important to note that inclusion of the Civilian Deaths variables reduces the 
number of observations from a maximum of n=1040 to a maximum of n=708 (dependent 
upon the Sexual Violence variable employed).  As such, we run each of our models with the 
inclusion of the Civilian Deaths variable and without this variable.   
We further control for the UCDP’s best estimate of Battle Deaths (Lacina and 
Gleditsch, 2005) in 10,000s a conflict-year.  One would expect that higher levels of casualties 
would garner increased attention from the UN.  The battle death variable correlates between 
r=0.06 and r=0.08 with the prevalence of sexual violence variables, above.  The intensity of 
battle deaths variable, likewise, is largely empirically distinct from our two measures of 
sexual violence.  As with the Civilian Deaths variable above, the inclusion of Battle Deaths 
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dramatically reduces the number of available observations.8  Battle Deaths (along with 
Civilian Violence) is therefore included in half of our estimations (Tables 1, 3, 5 and 6) and 
excluded from half of the tables (Tables 2, 4, A1, and A2) to allow for an examination of the 
impact of Sexual Violence on UNSC resolutions and their intensity for as many conflict-year 
observations as possible.   
 In addition, we include a variable for the post-Resolution 1325 period.  This 
resolution was unanimously passed by all 15 UNSC members on October 31, 2000 and 
specifically addressed the issue of sexual violence in international and civil conflict.  As 
noted above, we would expect the UNSC to pay more attention to conflicts with high levels 
of sexual violence but need to ensure that this attention is not wholly driven by the 
recognition of sexual violence as a valid conflict attribute in the post-UNSC 1325 era.  This 
variable is thus coded as 1 from 2001, onward and 0 otherwise.  We further include a lagged 
dummy variable for the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel, observers or police 
(Kathman 2013).  The prior establishment of a UN mission of any size, we recognize, might 
increase the likelihood of the presence of resolutions and/or high-level resolutions within a 
conflict year.  
We similarly control for a measure of the overall Conflict Duration and intensity of 
the conflict.  Cumulative Intensity takes a value of 1 when a civil conflict has crossed the 
1,000 battle- deaths threshold (UCDP).9   Given the UNSC’s mandate to help ensure regional 
peace and stability as well as parochial P5 interests, we suggest it is important to control for 
state attributes that might push the UN to be more attentive to conflicts.  As such we include 
                                                          
8 The inclusion of the battle deaths and one-sided violence variables decrease the number of observations by 
333 and 195, respectively. 
9 The intensity variable has a correlation coefficient of 0.17 with the Amnesty International measure of sexual 
violence, r=0.19 for Human Rights watch measure and r=0.25 for the State Department measure of sexual 
violence.  The UN Troops and Lag of Resolutions variables correlate at r=0.26. 
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controls for state’s population size (in 10,000’s) and Real GDP per capita
 
(in $100,000)  (both 
from Gleditsch 2002), Permanent Five colony status (1= former colony, else=0) is an 
additional important control for possible links, in particular trade relationships, between 
former colonies and members of the P5 group.  As noted by Berthou and Ehrhart (2017), pre-
established colonial ties can significantly affect trade networks with both the former colonial 
powers as well as the former colonizer’s neighbours.  Finally, we include a lagged dependent 
variable for the presence of past UNSC resolutions because past attention to a conflict by the 
UN should increase the likelihood of current attention and the likelihood of recommending 
increasingly intense action in a conflict.  
Analysis and Results 
Since we employ four different dependent variables, one binary, two-counts and one 
ordinal, we use logit, negative binomial regression, and ordinal logit to estimate our models.  
We present the coefficients in the tables below with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Two tailed significance levels for coefficients are indicated as superscripts next to the 
coefficients.   
Table 1 presents our results for the presence of a UNSC resolution in a civil conflict-
year with the inclusion of the Civilian Deaths and Battle Death variables.  Table 2 provides a 
model without the inclusion of Civilian Deaths and Battle-Related Deaths.  The Civilian 
Deaths variable, as expected, has a significant, positive relationship with the presence of 
UNSC resolutions but it not statistically significant in either of the four models.  In Table 1, 
the State Department measure of Sexual Violence is statistically significant but the Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International measures fail to obtain significance.  When a more 
complete number of conflict-years is analysed in Table 2, all three Prevalence of Sexual 
Violence measures have a significant impact on the presence of UNSC resolutions in a 
conflict year.  Likewise, in Table 2 (when the models are estimated with a larger number of 
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observations), Cumulative Conflict Intensity is generally shown to have a positive, significant 
impact on the presence of resolutions.  Not surprisingly, the presence of a UNSC resolution 
in the prior year increases the likelihood of a current resolution as does the established 
presence of UN personnel in the civil-conflict.  These three variables have a similarly 
positive and significant effect on UNSC resolutions in the following six tables presented 
below.  
Importantly, in Table 2, the lower values for the BICs and AICs (presented at the 
bottom of the tables) suggest that the models including the Prevalence of Sexual Violence 
variables (Models 2, 3, and 4) are preferable to the base model (i.e., Model 1).  The 
conclusions from the BICs and AICs are identical across all further estimations in the 
manuscript. Jointly, and across all but two of our 28 models presented in the manuscript,  
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Table 1 
Logit: Presence of UNSC Resolutions in a Conflict-Year 
1990-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Sexual Violence 
State Dept
 
 
 0.556*   
 (0.273)   
 
    
Sexual Violence 
HRW
 
 
  0.503  
  (0.315)  
 
    
Sexual Violence 
Amnesty Int
 
 
   0.299 
   (0.227) 
 
    
Civilian Deaths
 
 
0.265 0.315 0.196 0.287 
(0.273) (0.265) (0.238) (0.272) 
 
    
Battle Deaths 
 
 
0.705 0.693 0.813+ 0.703 
(0.483) (0.545) (0.480) (0.494) 
 
    
UN Personnel
 t-1 
2.034*** 2.113*** 2.042*** 2.061*** 
(0.426) (0.425) (0.416) (0.423) 
 
    
Cumulative 
Intensity
 
 
0.603 0.404 0.194 0.524 
(0.479) (0.504) (0.529) (0.487) 
 
    
Conflict Duration
 t-1 
-0.0155 -0.0136 -0.0094 -0.0151 
(0.0172) (0.017) (0.0176) (0.0172) 
 
    
Resolution 1325 0.828
+
 0.632 0.587 0.729 
(0.514) (0.483) (0.483) (0.466) 
 
    
P5 Colony -0.616
+
 -0.729* -0.410 -0.608+ 
(0.359) (0.367) (0.386) (0.362) 
 
    
rGDPpc
 
 
-0.114 -0.0615 -0.0675 -0.0771 
(0.146) (0.112) (0.123) (0.132) 
 
    
Population -0.324
+
 -0.328 -0.317 -0.325 
(0.196) (0.221) (0.207) (0.202) 
 
    
Resolution
 t-1 
3.468*** 3.524*** 3.427*** 3.492*** 
(0.413) (0.471) (0.469) (0.424) 
 
    
Constant -2.377*** -2.527** -2.527* -2.446*** 
 (0.438) (0.481) (0.522) (0.447) 
N 715 707 627 708 
Pseudo. R2 0.612 0.620 0.630 0.614 
Chi Square 147.64*** 154.86*** 127.58*** 145.13*** 
ll -126.05 -122.81 -109.49 -125.12 
AIC 274.1 269.6 243.0 274.2 
BIC 324.39 324.36 296.3 329.0 
Standard errors in parentheses,  +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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Table 2 
Logit: Presence of UNSC Resolutions in a Conflict-Year 
1990-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Sexual Violence 
State Dept
 
 
 0.609**   
 (0.191)   
 
    
Sexual Violence 
HRW 
  0.640*  
  (0.292)  
 
    
Sexual Violence 
Amnesty Int 
   0.487* 
   (0.198) 
 
    
UN Personnel
 t-1 
1.475*** 1.782*** 1.644*** 1.765*** 
(0.268) (0.337) (0.328) (0.332) 
 
    
Cumulative 
Intensity
 
 
0.990*** 0.841* 0.669 0.872* 
(0.270) (0.370) (0.369) (0.363) 
 
    
Conflict Duration
 
t-1 
-0.0139 -0.00806 -0.00683 -0.00833 
(0.0115) (0.0149) (0.0151) (0.0153) 
 
    
Resolution 1325 1.206
***
 0.738* 0.680 0.806* 
(0.300) (0.368) (0.370) (0.358) 
 
    
P5 Colony -0.540
*
 -0.648* -0.338 -0.498 
(0.266) (0.309) (0.317) (0.307) 
 
    
rGDPpc
 
 
-0.358** -0.170 -0.194 -0.186 
(0.134) (0.181) (0.200) (0.202) 
 
    
Population -0.118 -0.293 -0.278 -0.283 (0.0786) (0.172) (0.162) (0.162) 
 
    
Resolution
 t-1 
4.206*** 3.598*** 3.449*** 3.644*** 
(0.266) (0.358) (0.371) (0.340) 
 
    
Constant -3.168
***
 -3.030*** -2.759*** -3.000*** 
(0.354) (0.420) (0.452) (0.400) 
N 1621 1040 893 1032 
Pseudo. R2 0.654 0.630 0.633 0.624 
Chi Square 353.76*** 217.00*** 171.69*** 204.28*** 
ll -242.61 -167.14 -149.64 -169.29 
AIC 503.2 354.3 319.3 358.6 
BIC 551.7 403.8 367.2 408.0 
Standard errors in parentheses,  +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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these two, penalized-likelihood criteria suggest that the most parsimonious models are those 
that include the sexual violence variables.10   
Furthermore, four out of six models presented in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the 
presence of sexual violence in a conflict increases the likelihood of resolutions while 
controlling for civilian battle deaths, rebel and government battle deaths, the cumulative 
intensity of the conflict, the duration of the conflict, P-5 ties to the conflict state, the prior 
establishment of UN personnel in the conflict and a resolution in the prior year.11    
While the coefficients presented in Tables 1 and 2 are interesting, to better understand the 
substantive impact of key variables, it is important to also estimate the predicted probabilities 
of the likelihood of UN resolutions.  Based on our estimations from Model 2 (Table 2, we 
first examine a “most likely case-scenario” for UNSC resolutions with the presence of UN 
peacekeepers, a cumulative intensity of over 1000 battle deaths, and a prior resolution on the 
civil conflict (with all other variables set at their mean values).  When peacekeepers have 
been deployed, the presence of sexual violence has relatively little impact on the predicted 
probabilities of resolutions with the probability of a resolution ranging from 0.73 for no 
sexual violence to 0.81 for the highest level of sexual violence.  Since one might expect the 
UN to be predisposed towards addressing a conflict in a year after it has deployed forces to 
the arena, it is perhaps not surprising that the highest levels of sexual violence raise the 
probability of a resolution by less than 10%.12  
Figure 1, in contrast, presents the predicted probabilities for conflicts where the 
cumulative intensity of the conflict has not yet reached 1000 battle deaths and there is no 
established UN peacekeeping presence.  Under this, less favourable scenario, sexual 
                                                          
10 In Table 1 (with a reduced number of observations) the addition State Department and Human Rights Watch 
Sexual Violence variables (but not the Amnesty International variable) is preferable to the base model 
11 These variables have been shown to be important determinants of UNSC activity in conflicts in general 
(Beardsley and Schmidt 2012, Benson and Satana 2008). 
12 The graph of these predicted probabilities is presented in Appendix A4. 
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Figure 1 
 
violence has a much more important effect.  When there are no reports of sexual violence the 
probability of a UNSC resolution in the civil-conflict year is a much lower, 42%.  However, 
this probability jumps to 66% when there is systemic sexual violence.   This 57% increase in 
the likelihood of a UNSC resolution suggests that sexual violence can have an impact in 
determining UN attention despite the absence of other important conflict factors.   
The largest and most significant effects on the predicted likelihood of UNSC conflict 
resolutions occur with the highest level of sexual violence versus lower or no levels of sexual 
violence.  As such we estimate a logit and associated predicted probabilities of the highest 
versus all other levels of sexual violence.  We present these results below in Table 3.  
Holding independent variables at set values13, the presence of massive levels of sexual 
                                                          
13 Probabilities calculated for the presence of UN troops, over 1000 battle deaths, prior resolution, after passage 
of UNSC resolution 1325, non-P5 colony, and one year prior conflict duration.  All other variables set at mean 
values.   
25 
 
violence increase the predicted probability of a UNSC conflict resolution by 265% (from 
17% to 62%) and is significant at the p=0.06 level.  The presence of the highest level of 
sexual violence likewise appears to have an interactive effect on the impact of the presence of 
UN troops and the cumulative intensity of conflicts on the presence of UNSC resolutions.  At 
the highest level of sexual violence, conflict years with UN troops have a 182% higher 
probability of a UNSC conflict resolutions.  However, when massive levels of sexual 
violence are not present the is no longer statistically significant.  Similarly, conflicts with 
massive sexual violence that have surpassed the cumulative-intensity level of 1000 battle 
deaths are 55% more likely to receive UNSC resolutions.   When massive levels of sexual 
violence are absent, however, passing the cumulative intensity level no longer has a 
significant effect on changing the predicted probabilities of conflict resolutions.  In short, the 
presence of massive levels of sexual violence, ceteris paribus, is associated with important 
increases in the likelihood of UNSC resolutions on a conflict.  Importantly, the impact of 
sexual violence does not disappear in the presence other attributes that should be likely to 
push the UN towards resolutions (i.e., high numbers of battle deaths and the presence of UN 
troops).  Furthermore, the absence of massive levels of sexual violence seem to reduce the 
impact of other important determinants of UNSC resolutions.  
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Table 3: Predicted Probabilities of UNSC Conflict Resolution 
Variable 
Change 
Predicted 
Probability Levels 
Probability 
Change 
Significance of 
Probability Change* 
 
Sexual Violence: 
Non-Massive→Massive 
 
0.17→0.62 
 
 
+265% 
 
p=0.06 
94% CI: 0.003-0.90 
UN Troops with  
Massive Sexual Violence 
No UN Troops→UN 
Troops 
 
0.22→0.62 
 
+182% 
 
p=0.01 
99% CI: 0.077-0.71 
UN Troops with  
Non-Massive Sexual Viol. 
No UN Troops→UN 
Troops 
 
0.03→0.17 
 
n.s. 
 
n.s.at p=0.10 
Cumulative Intensity with  
Massive Sexual Viol. 
Under →Over 1000 Cum 
Battle Deaths 
 
0.40→0.62 
 
+55% 
 
p=0.02 
98% CI: 0.02-0.42 
Cumulative Intensity with  
Non-Massive Sexual Viol. 
Under →Over 1000 Cum 
Battle Deaths 
 
0.07→0.17 
 
n.s. 
 
n.s.at p=0.10 
*Confidence Intervals for Change in Predicted Probabilities calculated by the Delta Method in Stata 14.2.  
 
Of course, while any attention by the UNSC is an important preliminary step in the 
quest for international action, one could reasonably argue that consistent and high-level 
attention by the UN is a more reliable marker of consensus on the Security Council.  As such, 
the following four tables estimate the effects of the reported prevalence of sexual violence on 
the number of UNSC resolutions in a conflict-year, the highest level of recommended action 
in UNSC resolutions, and the number of high-level resolutions.   
Tables 4 and 5 present the negative binomial estimations of the count of UNSC 
resolutions in a conflict-year.  As above, Model 1 presents an estimation without the 
inclusion of our main theoretical independent variables.  In Models 2 through 4 in Table 4, 
the Prevalence of Sexual Violence variables significantly and positively impact the number of 
UNSC resolutions for the State Department and Human Rights measures.  While Civilian 
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Deaths is positively associated with higher level of resolutions, as with Battle Deaths, their 
effects are not significant.  Indeed, aside from past attention to the conflict by the UN in the 
form of a resolution in the prior year, prior establishment of troops or personnel, and conflict 
duration, the only significant variables that increase the rate of resolutions are the Sexual 
Violence variables.  In Table 5, with an increase in number of conflict-years, all Sexual 
Violence variables all have a positive, highly significant (p<=0.01) impact on the rate of 
resolutions and the Cumulative Intensity of deaths and former P5 colonial status once again 
obtain an expected significant relationship with the number of resolutions in a conflict-year.   
The impact of the Prevalence of Sexual Violence on the level of UNSC resolutions 
and the count of high-level UNSC resolutions as presented in Tables 6 and 7 are similarly 
consistent.  Indeed, sexual violence is shown to affect the intensity of UNSC resolutions 
positively and significantly in each of the 8 models in these two tables.  
To better ascertain the effect of sexual violence on the highest level of recommended 
UNSC actions in a civil-conflict-year, in Figure 2 we present the predicted probabilities of 
different resolution levels using the same conditions as the logit analyses of the predicted 
presence of UNSC resolutions.  As before, when we examine a theoretical “best-case” 
scenario for UNSC resolutions where there have been a high cumulative number of battle 
deaths and UN personnel are on the ground, the prevalence of sexual violence has little 
impact upon the likelihood of any level of action.  While the first five levels of action 
(statement, demand, mediation, sanctions, and outside action) are all statistically  
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Table 4 
Negative Binomial Logit: Count of UNSC Resolutions 
in a Conflict-Year, 1990-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Sexual Violence 
State Dept 
 0.273*   
 (0.125)   
 
    
Sexual Violence 
HRW 
  0.312*+  
  (0.139)  
 
    
Sexual Violence 
Amnesty Int 
   0.170* 
   (0.0845) 
 
    
Civilian Deaths 
0.542 0.533 0.436 0.533 
(0.406) (0.349) (0.292) (0.3699) 
 
    
Battle Deaths
 
 
-0.0704 -0.0316 0.0892 -0.0475 
(0.359) (0.333) (0.327) (0.355) 
     
UN Personnel
 t-1 
1.024*** 0.962*** 0.847*** 0.986*** 
(0.223) (0.235) (0.216) (0.228) 
 
    
Cumulative 
Intensity 
0.415 0.260 0.120 0.322 
(0.309) (0.301) (0.310) (0.310) 
     
Conflict Duration
 t-1 
-0.0324*** -0.0305*** -0.0297*** -0.0318*** 
(0.00790) (0.00803) (0.00789) (0.00798) 
 
    
Resolution 1325 0.374 0.247 0.306 0.314 (0.223) (0.249) (0.222) (0.221) 
 
    
P5 Colony -0.696
***
 -0.687** -0.644** -0.694** 
(0.182) (0.182) (0.179) (0.178) 
 
    
rGDPpc -0.158
+
 -0.149+ -0.157+ -0.142+ 
(0.0946) (0.0845) (0.0897) (0.0823) 
 
    
Population -0.0187 -0.0238 -0.0210 -0.0227 (0.0264) (0.0352) (0.0323) (0.0328) 
 
    
Resolution
 t-1 
2.509*** 2.442*** 2.381*** 2.484*** 
(0.244) (0.251) (0.239) (0.246) 
 
    
Constant -1.378
**
 -1.378*** -1.145** -1.348*** 
(0.272) (0.279) (0.272) (0.271) 
N 715 707 627 708 
Pseudo. R2 0.289 0.297 0.295 0.291 
Chi Square 406.89*** 492.72*** 326.95*** 421.95*** 
ll -424.15 -418.70 -390.01 -422.18 
AIC 872.3 863.4 806.0 870.4 
BIC 927.2 922.7 863.7 929.7 
Alphas significant at p<0.001, Standard errors in parentheses, +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5 
Negative Binomial Logit: Count of UNSC Resolutions  
in a Conflict-Year, 1990-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Sexual Violence 
State Dept
 
 
 0.286**   
 (0.105)   
 
    
Sexual Violence 
HRW
 
 
  0.377**  
  (0.126)  
 
    
Sexual Violence 
Amnesty Int. 
   0.270** 
   (0.0826) 
 
    
UN Personnel
 t-1 
0.899*** 0.870*** 0.734*** 0.898*** 
(0.153) (0.208) (0.197) (0.203) 
 
    
Cumulative 
Intensity
 
 
0.656*** 0.671*** 0.530** 0.661*** 
(0.144) (0.185) (0.189) (0.191) 
 
    
Conflict Duration
 
t-1 
-0.0236*** -0.0311*** -0.0311*** -0.0315*** 
(0.00491) (0.00701) (0.00668) (0.00696) 
 
    
Resolution 1325 0.458
**
 0.273 0.310 0.316 
(0.143) (0.189) (0.181) (0.176) 
 
    
P5 Colony -0.613
***
 -0.609*** -0.546** -0.609*** 
(0.137) (0.169) (0.167) (0.167) 
 
    
rGDPpc
 
 
-0.288** -0.191 -0.201 -0.178 
(0.111) (0.106) (0.105) (0.0980) 
 
    
Population 0.00614 -0.0160 -0.0167 -0.0171 (0.0132) (0.0245) (0.0290) (0.0253) 
 
    
Resolution
 t-1 
2.668*** 2.544*** 2.449*** 2.587*** 
(0.201) (0.235) (0.222) (0.231) 
 
    
Constant -1.846*** -1.776*** -1.495*** -1.738*** 
 (0.198) (0.233) (0.230) (0.224) 
N 1621 1040 893 1032 
Pseudo. R2 0.324 0.309 0.307 0.305 
Chi Square 620.43*** 493.21*** 377.70*** 481.50*** 
ll -837.89 -562.07 -519.55 -563.81 
AIC 1695.8 1146.1 1061.1 1149.6 
BIC 1749.7 1200.6 1113.9 1203.9 
Alphas significant at p<0.001, Standard errors in parentheses, +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6 
Negative Binomial Logit: Count of High-Level UNSC Resolutions  
in a Conflict-Year, 1990-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Sexual Violence 
State Dept
 
 
 0.392*   
 (0.154)   
 
    
Sexual Violence 
HRW 
  0.465**  
  (0.131)  
 
    
Sexual Violence 
Amnesty Int
 
 
   0.462*** 
   (0.105) 
 
    
Civilian Deaths
 
 
0.589* 0.606* 0.495* 0.605*** 
(0.251) (0.251) (0.225) (0.233) 
 
    
Battle Deaths 
 
 
-0.660 -0.625 -0.480 -0.714 
(0.560) (0.611) (0.576) (0.562) 
 
    
UN Personnel
 t-1 
1.238*** 1.178*** 0.861** 1.132*** 
(0.292) (0.320) (0.276) (0.321) 
 
    
Cumulative 
Intensity
 
 
0.651+ 0.428 0.278 0.430 
(0.382) (0.407) (0.373) (0.391) 
 
    
Conflict Duration
 
t-1 
-0.0693*** -0.0698*** -0.0661*** -0.0704*** 
(0.0102) (0.0110) (0.0103) (0.0115) 
 
    
Resolution 1325 -0.772
**
 -0.661* 0.678* 0.636 
(0.278) (0.306) (0.270) (0.287) 
 
    
P5 Colony -0.674
**
 -0.734** -0.693** -0.734** 
(0.248) (0.262) (0.249) (0.252) 
 
    
rGDPpc
 
 
-0.254 -0.251 -0.287 -0.231 
(0.229) (0.216) (0.251) (0.193) 
 
    
Population 0.00951 0.00880 0.0162 0.00729 (0.0239) (0.0213) (0.0262) (0.0187) 
 
    
Resolution
 t-1 
1.755*** 1.595*** 1.524*** 1.611*** 
(0.287) (0.314) (0.314) (0.312) 
 
    
Constant -1.965*** -1.921*** -1.588*** -1.856*** 
 (0.349) (0.347) (0.331) (0.332) 
N 715 707 627 708 
Pseudo. R2 0.310 0.327 0.336 0.330 
Chi Square 202.27*** 229.20*** 168.48*** 192.17*** 
ll -201.70 -196.32 -184.87 -195.42 
AIC 427.4 418.6 395.7 416.8 
BIC 482.3 477.9 435.5 476.2 
Alphas significant at p<0.001, Standard errors in parentheses, +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 7 
Ordered Logit: Highest Level of UNSC Resolutions  
in a Conflict-Year, 1990-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Sexual Violence 
State Dept
 
 
 0.417**   
 (0.159)   
 
    
Sexual Violence 
HRW 
  0.527*  
  (0.212)  
 
    
Sexual Violence 
Amnesty Int
 
 
   0.552** 
   (0.154) 
 
    
Civilian Deaths
 
 
0.474+ 0.506+ 0.388 0.525+ 
(0.276) (0.274) (0.258) (0.277) 
 
    
Battle Deaths 
 
 
-0.530 -0.552 -0.226 -0.594 
(0.584) (0.589) (0.525) (0.597) 
 
    
UN Personnel
 t-1 
1.470*** 1.451*** 1.419*** 1.525*** 
(0.344) (0.368) (0.349) (0.367) 
 
    
Cumulative 
Intensity
 
 
0.471 0.314 -0.0314 0.296 
(0.430) (0.438) (0.493) (0.453) 
 
    
Conflict Duration
 
t-1 
-0.0301* -0.0283* -0.0251+ -0.0285* 
(0.0131) (0.0133) (0.0140) (0.0132) 
 
    
Resolution 1325 0.413 0.256 0.268 0.264 (0.430) (0.438) (0.493) (0.453) 
 
    
P5 Colony -0.573* -0.597* -0.537
+
 -0.592* 
(0.284) (0.282) (0.306) (0.288) 
 
    
rGDPpc
 
 
-0.278+ -0.247 -0.253 -0.204 
(0.160) (0.152) (0.155) (0.129) 
 
    
Population -0.149 -0.157 -0.164 -0.159 (0.135) (0.140) (0.139) (0.138) 
 
    
Resolution
 t-1 
2.971*** 2.954*** 2.769*** 3.023*** 
(0.465) (0.468) (0.489) (0.474) 
 
    
Constant 1.688
***
 1.769*** 1.377*** 1.810*** 
(0.400) (0.407) (0.445) (0.404) 
N 715 707 627 708 
Pseudo. R2 0.365 0.371 0.378 0.374 
Chi Square 213.43*** 216.56*** 182.11*** 225.39*** 
ll -325.61 -321.62 -291.55 -319.97 
AIC 683.2 677.2 617.1 673.9 
BIC 756.4 754.8 692.6 751.5 
Standard errors in parentheses, +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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 significantly distinct from no action, they are not always distinct from one another and the 
individual predicted probabilities are quite low (see Appendix, Figure A5 for civil conflicts 
with UN personnel and less than 1000 cumulative deaths).   
Figure 2 
 
The aggregate predicted probability of a UNSC resolution short of peacekeeping is 
approximately 15% when there is systemic sexual violence (level 3).  The predicted 
probability of peacekeeping resolutions, is significantly different from zero when sexual 
violence is widespread and systemic (levels 2 and 3).  When sexual violence is presence at its 
highest levels, the predicted probability of a peacekeeping resolution is 0.57%.  Thus, sexual 
violence may have an important impact on UN conflict responses by pushing UNSC 
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resolutions to higher levels of resolution outcomes above and beyond concurrent factors 
pushing the UN towards such actions.    
Under less favourable conditions, the presence of sexual violence has a lower absolute 
but still positive impact upon the level of resolutions.  At higher levels of sexual violence, 
UNSC resolutions short of peacekeeping are significantly different than the predicted 
probability for no resolution.  Only the lowest levels of the prevalence of sexual violence, 
however, have an impact on the predicted probabilities of peacekeeping resolutions.  
We further estimate the impact of different levels of sexual violence on different 
levels of the ordered logit dependent variable (i.e., no resolution, demand, diplomacy, 
sanction or siege, establishment or expansion of outside or regional IGO use of force, 
establishment or expansion of UN Peacekeeping operation) in Table 8, below.14  The largest 
effects of the prevalence of sexual violence are on the predicted probabilities of the absence 
of a UNSC resolution on a conflict.  The likelihood of no UNSC resolution drops 
significantly when moving from no sexual violence to all other levels of sexual violence.  Not 
surprisingly, the largest absolute effects (i.e., a decrease of 65% to 29% in the predicted 
probability of no resolution) is observed when comparing the effects of no sexual violence to 
massive reports of sexual violence.  As regards the absolute probabilities of diplomacy, 
sanction or siege, or the approval or expansion of the outside use of force by regional IGOs or 
another state-level conflict actors, the likelihood is always quite low given the limited base 
probability of such UNSC resolutions.  However, the impact of higher levels of sexual 
violence on the percent change in predicted probabilities of higher levers of UNSC 
resolutions is quite important, ranging from a 40% to a 200% increase in the likelihood of a  
 
                                                          
14 We employ the same base settings for the independent variables as employed in the predicted probabilities for 
logits, above.   
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Table 8: Predicted Probabilities of Level of UNSC Conflict Resolution 
Change in Reported 
Level of Sexual 
Violence  
Predicted 
Probability Levels 
Probability  
Change  
95% Confidence 
Interval 
 No Resolution   
 
None→Some 
None→Many 
None→Massive 
 
Some→Many 
Some→Massive 
 
 
0.65→0.53 
0.65→0.40 
0.65→0.29 
 
0.53→0.40 
0.53→0.29 
  
 
-18% 
-38% 
-55% 
 
-25% 
-45% 
 
 
-0.23 – -0.01 
-0.38 – -0.11   
-0.52 – -0.19  
 
-0.19 – -0.06  
-0.42 – -0.05   
 
 Diplomacy   
 
None→Many 
 
 
0.09→0.15 
 
+67% 
 
0.02 – 0.10 
 Sanction or Siege   
 
None→Massive 
Some→Massive 
 
 
0.01→0.03 
0.02→0.04 
 
+200% 
+100% 
 
0.004 – 0.04 
0.001 – 0.07 
 Outside Use of 
Force 
  
 
Some→Massive 
Many →Massive 
 
 
0.04→0.07 
0.05→0.07 
 
+75% 
+40% 
 
0.001 – 0.07 
0.005 – 0.03 
**Confidence Intervals for Change in Predicted Probabilities calculated by the Delta Method in Stata 14.2. 
 
resolution.  As such, we suggest, that any impact on the probability of an increased level UN 
response in civil conflicts is meaningful.   
Higher levels of sexual violence, however, do not have a significant effect on UNSC 
resolutions in which the highest level is to simply state a demand or on the level of 
resolutions establishing/expanding of UN peacekeeping operations.  Despite the lack of a 
significant impact on this highest level of UNSC resolutions, it is important to note that the 
results presented in Table 8 in conjunction with those presented in Tables 1-7 above and their 
associated predicted probabilities, provide important support for the generalized hypotheses 
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that the presence and higher levels of sexual violence significantly increases UN attention 
and higher levels of response to civil conflicts.    
To ensure that our models were robust to a variety of specifications we also included 
controls for the calendar year to ensure that that a potential increase in reporting of sexual 
violence over time was not responsible for the generally statistically significant relationship 
between our primary independent and dependent variables.  The year variable was only 
significant in two of the base models and in none of the models which included sexual 
violence (i.e., 2 out of the 36 models in Tables 1-7 and A1-A2).  Inclusion of the year 
variable never had a substantive effect on the size or significance of the sexual violence 
variable.  We additionally estimated all models with the absolute number of troops rather 
than a dummy variable for troop presence.  This operationalization of the presence of UN 
peacekeeping troops had no substantive effect on our results. 15     
Conclusions 
In summary, our study provides empirical support for a gendered imperative in UNSC 
responses to civil conflicts.  Taken together, the results suggest that sexual violence has a 
significant, independent impact on driving the UN towards action in civil conflicts.  This 
impact can be seen even when there are other important factors, such as a high cumulative 
intensity of deaths and the prior establishment of UN troops in a conflict.   
                                                          
15 We also ran each of models while lagging these four variables.  The results are similar to those presented in 
the tables for the deaths variables with Civilian Deaths obtaining significance in 25% of models. For Battle 
Deaths, there is significance in 19% of models and UN Personnel obtains significance for 33% of models.  For 
the Level of Sexual Violence variables there is significance for one of the variables in 25% of full models and in 
38% of all models.  Thus, in the lagged models, Sexual Violence performs at least as well or better than 
traditional casualty variables in predicting UNSC resolutions and performs better than the UN personnel 
variable which is also present in all models (38% versus 33%).  We follow the same approach as prior work on 
the impact of temporally aggregate contemporaneous variables on UNSC resolutions and actions for 
international crises (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012).  
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In short, the results presented here suggest that the UN Security Council is, at the 
least, implicitly attentive to sexual violence in conflicts. Sexual violence appears to affect the 
likelihood of both the presence and frequency of resolutions regarding a specific conflict.  
This is the case both when our models are estimated with a more limited sample controlling 
for civilian deaths and when the largest sample of civil conflict-years is employed.  Thus, one 
might suggest that sexual violence is an important conflict “attribute” just as war duration, 
civilian deaths, or conflict intensity have been shown to be in prior literature on UNSC 
Resolutions.  
The significant impact of three different measures of reported sexual violence on the 
presence, level, and number of high-level UNSC resolutions further suggests that the UN’s 
limited explicit discussion of sexual violence within its resolutions does not represent a lack 
of UN response to the phenomenon.  After the passage of UNSCR 1325, the long delay of 
adding language on sexual violence in subsequent resolutions and the relative paucity of 
resolutions that mention sexual violence, are not indicative of an absence of impact of sexual 
violence on the UN’s attention to civil conflicts.   
In fact, the passage of UNSCR1325 in 2000 was not a watershed moment, but rather 
the amalgamation of the continuous efforts of a decade of civil society organizations activism 
to raise awareness on the devastating effect of sexual violence on civilians during and after 
violent armed conflicts.  Given that two out of the three of the measures of the reporting of 
sexual violence employed here are based upon Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International reports, our results also point to the importance of independent NGO 
assessments of conflict attributes in civil wars.  The essential role of government, NGOs and 
other civil society organizations in bringing attention to crimes against civilians has been 
hinted at in the literature that examines one-sided violence in civil wars.  Meernick et al. 
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2012) show that higher numbers of human rights organizations in countries increase the 
reporting and urgent actions and campaigns by Amnesty International.    
Our study is not without limitations.  The analysis does not address whether the UN is 
capable or willing to impact levels of sexual violence within civil conflict. Feminist research 
has even argued that the UN cannot be used to increase women’s and civilians’ security, 
since peacekeeping remains a tool of militarization rather than a genuine alternative to war 
(for example, see Shepherd 2016; Tryggestad 2009; Whitworth 2004). Susan Willett (2010) 
even argues that the power inequalities within the UN tend to overshadow the gender 
discourse and to submerge it under the hierarchical patriarchal structures and militarist values 
of the organization without prospects for promoting genuine changes in the structures that 
generate violence against women.  
Our findings raise concerns about unintended consequences that we cannot explore in 
this paper, but are important to reflect upon.  A key concern in feminist research is the 
political consequences of what is measured and who provides information.  The SVAC 
dataset has significant limitations in capturing different forms of sexual violence because of 
the original sources it uses.  The framing of sexual violence by international organizations 
and agencies tends to conflate sexual violence against women with “gender-based violence” 
contributing to the marginalization of male victims of sexual violence (Charman 2018). The 
lack of engagement with male victims by non-governmental organizations contributes to the 
under-reporting of sexual violence, a major challenge for scholars and policymakers alike 
(Shivakumaran 2007).  
Focusing on women as victims of rape raises questions of whether groups often 
engage in specific forms of violence that draw attention to the conflict and their demands by 
international actors. The recent use of extreme violence to influence an international audience 
by the Islamist State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS or ISIL) brings into question whether groups 
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increasingly engage in sexual violence to generate a response by the UN or other 
international actors. Subsequently, sexual violence becomes more frequent for strategic 
reasons.  
Fortunately, currently, there is no evidence that this is the case. Our cases suggest that 
UN response does not lead to high levels of sexual violence.  The existing literature on sexual 
violence in armed conflicts suggests that most cases of sexual violence are the outcome of the 
failures of structure and command within fighting parties rather than a strategic choice. 
Incidents of rape while widespread, primarily fall under the principle-agent framework with 
breakdowns of order and organizational capacity as the leading reason behind the use of rape.  
In fact, most cases of sexual violence have been random rather than strategic. Often 
government forces, rather than rebel groups, are the main perpetrators of sexual violence 
(Baaz and Stern 2013; Cohen, Green, and Wood 2013; Nordӓs 2011).  The potential ad-hoc 
use of such violence in conflict, however, in no way mitigates its impact on populations in 
civil wars. Future research might want to explore the implications for advocacy of how 
sexual violence is framed, often essentialized, by non-governmental organizations and 
policymakers alike.  
As with prior work, our paper corroborates that the UNSC members are responsive to 
attributes of violent conflicts (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Benson and Satana 2008) such as 
large numbers of battle deaths. However, we expand upon this research in illustrating that 
sexual violence is an additional, significant, attribute of violent armed conflicts as perceived 
by the UN.  Importantly, the impact of sexual violence is shown to be independent of the 
process of UNSCR 1325.  We thus suggest that conflict attributes, such as sexual violence, 
have a consequential impact on UNSC resolutions (the pre-coursers to UN action) even when 
no explicit mention is made of the conflict attribute in the resolutions themselves.    
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